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The debate if the point null hypothesis is ever literally true cannot be resolved, because 
there are three competing statistical systems claiming ownership of the construct. The 
local resolution depends on personal acclimatization to a Fisherian, Frequentist, or 
Bayesian orientation (or an unexpected fourth champion if decision theory is allowed to 
compete). Implications of Rao and Lovric’s proposed Hodges-Lehman paradigm are 
discussed in the Appendix.  
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In their historical reviews of experimental design, Cochran (1977) and Frank 
Yates posited the first planned controlled experiment was conducted by Daniel 
(7th–6th century BCE), who employed a ten day treatment vs comparison group 
post-test only trial. The purpose was to demonstrate the efficacy of a Kosher diet 
of high protein, low fat, dried legume seeds and water on soldiering skills vs 
Nebuchadnezzar’s army’s royal comestible of non-Kosher wine and meat (Daniel 
1:3-16). In Contra Celsus (1:15), Origen of Alexandria (153–253 CE) cited 
Hermippus (5th century BCE) and Hecatæus (4th century, BCE, presumably of 
Abdera) who opined subsequent development of analytical analyses of 
experimental principles by the Jews influenced, if not culminated in, Pythagoras’ 
philosophy of mathematical sciences. Subsequently, Tana Kama (Mishna Gittin 
7:1; Talmud Gittin 67b) underscored the importance of co-variables and the 
minimum number of repetitions for a reliable single subject study design. Shimon 
ben Chalafta also invoked experimental replications to test claims (e.g., Talmud 
Chulin 57b). 
In the middle of the 2nd century CE, Galen (Aelius/Claudius Galenus)  
mused how much credence should be given, if any, to a 50th medical study if the 
previous 49 replications were of no significance. In the early 11 th century CE, 
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Avicenna (Abu ibn Sina) reacted to haphazard methods in the conduct and 
analysis of experiments and presented seven governing rules. In 1266 CE, Roger 
Bacon systematized observation of empirical data in controlled experiments. 
Arthur Young (1771, Figure 1) published a course on experimental agriculture, 
wherein comparative designs employing standardized methods and analyses were 
proposed. The analysis of the hypothesis “every year there shall be born more 
males than females” (1710-1712, p. 188) by John Arbuthnott (un-admittedly 
inspired by Sir William Petty & John Graunt) is considered the origin of the 
nonparametric Sign Test, although it predates more formal origins of empirical 
probability captured in the treatises on the doctrines of conjecture and chance by 
Jacob Bernoulli (1713), Abraham de Moivre (1718) and Thomas Bayes (Price, 
1763, p. 370). 
In the early part of the 20th century CE, Sir Ronald Fisher (influenced by 
Pierre-Simon Laplace, Carl Gauss, Joseph Jastrow, Sir Francis Galton, Karl 
Pearson, G. Udny Yule, William Gosset, and certainly others; perhaps later also 
with Andrey Kolmogorov & E. J. G. Pittman) defined the null hypothesis, the 
fundamental building block of modern hypothesis testing, as being true unless 
there is evidence from the sample (randomly obtained or data at hand) to the 
contrary. His innovations regarding blocking variables and factorial layouts were 
pioneering developments in the design of experiments. 
Following the logic of experimentation by C. S. Peirce in late 19 th century, 
the Frequentist lemma by Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson developed in the 
1930s-1940s violated the Fisherian cannon with the introduction of the alternative 
hypothesis. It was indeed irrefragable blasphemy, because Frequentists must 
admit the choice and magnitude of the alternative are subjective and independent 
of both the null hypothesis and the sample. Other 20 th century developments in 
experimental design included orthogonal arrays by my esteemed colleague 
Professor C. R. Rao, sequential experiments by Abraham Wald and later Herman 
Chernoff, and the quality control designs of Genichi Taguchi. 
Nevertheless, the Frequentists had the advantage, because in the Fisherian 
system the lack of an alternative obviated the desired notion of fixed comparative 
statistical power, and by extension, stable effect size. These two modern 
approaches to statistics are antipodal. Many misunderstandings in hypothesis 
testing are due to their intrinsic incompatibility, starting with Sir Fisher’s “lapsus 
linguae” (Neyman, 1941, p. 129) fiducial argument (see Sawilowsky, 2003). 
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Figure 1. Arthur Young (1801), Annals of Agriculture and other Useful Arts, Vol 37. 
London: Rackham & Hill. (From the JMASM Archives.) 
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This struggle provided the segue for a Bayesian resurrection from Fisher’s 
epithet, “From a purely historical standpoint it is worth noting that the ideas and 
nomenclature for which I am responsible were developed only after I had inured 
myself to the absolute rejection of the postulate of Inverse Probability” (1937a, p. 
151; see also 1937b, 1939). Although also receiving a boost from C. S. Peirce’s 
logic, Bayesian analysis during Sir Fisher’s reign was conducted without benefit 
of his development of degrees of freedom. The initial inability to replicate 
Fisherian/Frequentist numerical results was a serious setback to the modern 
Bayesian paradigm (Sawilowsky, 2002, 2003). Although they have since 
recovered and inverse probability is currently quite popular, unless there are 
documented informative prior probabilities available, such as baseball batting 
averages, Fisher’s inurement prevails. 
Now comes the debate on certifying the literal truth of the null hypothesis. 
Original Fisherians needs no proof, because postulation of the putative null was 
the pivotal theoretic spanning well over two millennia in the science of 
discovering truth. Frequentists, however, can never accept any proof. The most 
that can be said is based on the current sample there is no evidence to support the 
alternative. (This should not be considered an open invitation to collecting 
potentially endless (a) random samples, known as the quest for a Type I error and 
its attendant rewards of publishing and tenure or (b) data sets at hand, known as 
non-representative findings never interpreted with caution to support situational 
truths with its attendant rewards of political fodder, ill-begotten relief from the 
court, financial returns based on false advertising, etc.) Moreover, it wouldn’t 
matter even if the null hypothesis is always literally false, because it must be false 
to an a priori specified magnitude to be rejected. 
The Frequentist nomenclature, failure to reject the null hypothesis, was just 
the ticket in the social and behavioral sciences, where politically correct thinking 
of the 1960s had begun to take control of those in charge of the keys to situational 
truths. At best, near-null, near-nil, and the like, were approved substitutes. 
Philosophically, the yellow submarine is a closed system, so at some decimal of 
the mantissa there must be a non-Zero value. 
The various Frequentist counterproofs were flawed attempts to make 
something out of nothing by incorrectly preserving the post hoc effect size even 
when the statistical test was not significant. For example, in the two sample layout, 
the t statistic is a test of difference between two means. If the p value is above the 
a priori selected nominal α level, it means the observed difference is not real and 
should be read as zero. Based on the sample, assumed to be random for 
generalization purposes, there is no evidence that the populations from which they 
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were drawn differed in terms of location. Just as the observed difference in means 
can be safely ignored, the effect size was not statistically significantly different 
from zero, and can be safely ignored.  
This means regardless of the magnitude of the obtained value (e.g., Cohen’s 
d, 1962, 1969, 1977, 1988) in the two sample layout [from very small (0.01; 
Sawilowksy, 2009) to small (0.2; Cohen, 1988) to moderate (0.5; Cohen, 1988) to 
large (0.8; Cohen, 1988) to very large (1.2; Sawilowsky, 2009) to huge (2.0; 
Sawilowsky, 2009)], it should be read and interpreted as zero. Hence, the point 
null hypothesis, to the Fisherian, is indeed considered to be literally true 
regardless of the magnitude of Cohen’s d when the p value is greater than nominal 
α. 
In the antecedent article, colleagues C. R. Rao and M. Lovric 
(http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/jmasm/vol15/iss2/2), cited Cohen (1990) who 
wrote the null hypothesis can only be true “in the bowels of a computer processor 
running a Monte Carlo study (and even then a stray electron may make it false)” 
(p. 1, 308). Based on my letters with him, documented elsewhere, Cohen’s 
statement was not surprising. 
Subsequently, this was discussed conceptually in Knapp and Sawilowsky 
(2001, p. 71-74; for expanded commentary relative to the debate see Harlow, et 
al., 1997; Imbens & Rubin, 2015). I included Meehl’s (1990) recapitulation that 
he initially referred only to quasi-experiments and surveys (Meehl, 1978), but 
later admitted the null hypothesis can be literally true in an “experimental study” 
(Meehl, 1990, p. 204). (Carol H. Ammons, the co-Editor of Psychological 
Reports where it was published, sent me a reprint of Meehl (1990) soon after its 
publication. In our subsequent conversation, I was supportive of Meehl’s 
recapitulation, and I remain so today.) Similarly, in Knapp and Sawilowksy 
(2001) I also included Hagen’s (1997, p. 20) imputed recapitulation of Cohen 
(1994). 
A simple demonstration of the algorithm I presented in Knapp and 
Sawilowsky (2001) is coded in R in Figure 2. When executed, it creates two 
groups, x and y, and populates them with scores randomly selected from the 
standard normal curve. Although a Monte Carlo is unnecessary when underlying 
assumptions are met, it is employed to facilitate the demonstration. The two 
independent samples pooled variance t test is conducted on the data, and if the p 
value is less than nominal α = 0.05, a counter is incremented. The process is 
repeated 100,000 times. The final value of the counter is divided by the number of 
repetitions to produce the Type I error rate. 
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The code will produce the same result on any computer platform and 
operating system, because the seed number is set for the pseudo-random number 
generator. That result is 0.04919. Rejections occurred across the 100,000 
repetitions, but they were known false positives. The point null hypothesis was 
indeed literally true, because it was programmed to be so. The collection of false 
positives that give rise to the notion the point null is never literally true were 
simply the constituent figments of imagination that sum to the Type I error rate. 
 
 
set.seed (123457) 
to5 <- NULL 
rep <- 100000 
rejt05 <- numeric(length=rep) 
ss <- 30 
for (i in 1:rep) { 
   x1 <- rnorm(ss) 
   x <- x1+0.0 
   y <- rnorm(ss) 
   tp <- t.test(x,y,var=TRUE)[["p.value"]] 
   rejt05[i] <- ifelse (tp < 0.05,1,0) 
 } 
t05 <- sum(rejt05)/rep 
 
Figure 2. Monte Carlo t Test in R Code 
 
 
 
The rejection rate obtained from the code will approach 0.05 as (a) the 
sample size, set to 30 per group in this example, increases, (b) the number of 
repetitions of the experiment increases, or (c) possibly even with the current study 
parameters if a different initial seed number is selected (Hill & Sawilowsky, 
2011). For example, if the number of repetitions is increased to 1,000,000, the 
Type I error improves to 0.049858. 
A non-null condition can be created by replacing the 0.0 with a non-zero 
number (positive or negative) in the line x <− x1 + 0.0. For example, to 
model a very small effect size of 0.01 (Sawilowsky, 2009), replace the 0.0 in this 
code segment with a constant c = 0.01 (representing 0.01*σ; where σ refers to the 
standard deviation of the normal curve = 1). The constant c is added to each 
member of the x group and shifts its location by that magnitude, while leaving the 
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scale unaffected. The resulting rejection rate is known as statistical power (not 
Type I error rate). With 100,000 repetitions it amounts to 0.04923, a nuanced but 
detectable difference of 0.00004 above nominal α for this sample size and data 
pseudo-randomly sampled from the standard normal curve. 
If the effect size is increased to 0.05 the power yield increases to .05342, 
and for an effect size of 0.1 the power increases to 0.06542. For Cohen’s (1988) 
small effect size of 0.2, the power increases further to 0.11611. As the effect size 
approaches infinity (and depending on the distribution and sample size, the effect 
size may not need to increase past a small fraction or multiple of its σ) the power 
approaches 1. 
Random numbers represent a literally true null condition. This R code 
proves that when the point null is literally true, the t test (if all conditions are met, 
i.e., normality, homoscedasticity, independence) will retain the null hypothesis to 
the nominal α level. Hence, in real world applications of a true randomized 
experimental design, if there is no difference between x  and y  (the two sample 
means) the t test will testify to that fact.  
Execution of the R code demonstrates increasing the sample size and/or 
number of repetitions of the experiment to ∞ will not lead to a rejection rate of the 
null hypothesis different from nominal α, which is the answer to Cohen’s 
speculation of what might happen in the bowels of a Monte Carlo study. 
Moreover, despite the current fascination with big data (and hopefully its ardent 
fans are able to recognize and deprecate its often hidden or embedded stepwise 
methods), Gosset noted many in applied disciplines we are forced to work with 
small samples. This was aptly captured in Sir Fisher’s revelation to Samuel 
Stouffer regarding the inspiration for deriving a certain postulate: something had 
to be done when rabbits got into the garden and ate a lot of the degrees of freedom.  
To the Fisherian, QED. To the Frequentist, the discussion is much ado about 
(something that can never be literally) nothing. To the Bayesian, add non-
informative priors to the perils of non-normality, heteroscedasticity, and non-
independence; and then choose sides. 
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Appendix 
In Knapp and Sawilowsky (2001), I presented rebuttals to “the following 
propositions: 
 
 The null hypothesis is always false. 
 A sufficiently large enough sample guarantees rejection of the null 
hypothesis. 
 Statistical tests are of no use because the results do not address 
practical importance. 
 Testing a near-nil null hypothesis is better than testing a null 
hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis testing does not lead to scientific discoveries. 
 Confidence intervals are superior to hypothesis testing. 
 Effect sizes should be reported regardless of the outcome of 
hypothesis testing.” (p. 71). 
 
The subjectivity of defining a near-nil null hypothesis will also have a deleterious 
effect on equivalence testing, and could be added to the above list. 
With regard to testing a near-nil null instead of a null hypothesis, Rao and 
Lovric, in the antecedent article, proposed a paradigm shift to testing the 
negligible null hypothesis: 
 
H0 :|θ – θ0| ≤ δ (Effect size is negligible) against 
H1 :|θ – θ0| > δ (Effect size is practically meaningful). 
 
They aptly named it the “Hodges-Lehmann paradigm,” a nomenclature well 
known in other contexts. In R-measures of location, for example, the inversion of 
signed ranks can lead to the Hodges-Lehmann estimator, a robust (median 
unbiased) pseudo-θ point estimator of symmetry (Hodges & Lehmann, 1963). In 
bracketed (see Sawilowsky, 2003, p. 128) intervals, the Hodge-Lehmann 
treatment alternative is modeled by a systematic progression from pseudo-θ, 
although no expertise is called on to determine negligible or practical 
meaningfulness. 
Regarding near-nill null hypotheses within the context of hypothesis testing, 
I’ve opined (Knapp & Sawilowsky, 2001),  
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This remedy's attendant difficulties are obvious considering the 
chaos that would arise from the infinite number of near-nils that might 
be chosen. (Eventually, we speculate, some common near-nils would 
emerge and evolve into a universally accepted traditional near-nil, 
completing the circle.) Moreover, the near-nil weakens the Fisherian 
logic regarding the null hypothesis, which is indirect proof by 
contradiction. If the probability associated with sample data obtained 
from a designed study is so remote, the null hypothesis or the model 
that generated it is contradicted. Rejecting a null hypothesis should be 
more compelling than rejecting an arbitrarily chosen near-nil 
hypothesis. Also, in the social and behavioral sciences for cases in 
which treatment effects or naturally occurring differences are often 
tiny, using the near-nil hypothesis when investigating interventions 
with potentially subtle differences may hide a treatment effect. 
Similarly, as the magnitude of the near-nil increases, the sample size 
necessary to detect a false near-nil null hypothesis increases in the 
treatment versus control group and related designs, which would be 
highly undesirable. (p. 73). 
 
